I. INTRODUCTION
In Michigan v. Long,' the United States Supreme Court concluded that a police officer's protective search for weapons in the passenger compartment of a car does not violate the fourth amendment 2 when, absent probable cause, the officer possesses a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon. 3 The Court justified this decision on the basis of Terry v. Ohio 4 which allowed a police officer to conduct a pat-down frisk for weapons without probable cause because the officer possessed a reasonable belief that the suspect was armed and dangerous.
The Court in Long, by permitting an area search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, extended Ter, beyond the narrow confines of a limited body search. This extension is consistent with the rationale of Terry. The reasoning that permits a Terry pat-down frisk of an individual applies with equal force to a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile. The application of Terr, to an automobile, how-' 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983) . 2 The fourth amendment states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. 3 103 S. Ct. at 3480-81. 4 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Tey, a police officer observed three men surreptitiously "casing" a store and suspected they were planning a robbery. Although the officer did not have probable cause to arrest, he approached the men. Because the officer feared that the suspects were armed, he conducted a pat-down frisk of one of the suspect's outer clothing. Upon patting Terry, the officer felt a pistol. He then reached into Terry's pocket and removed a .38 caliber revolver. Terry was arrested, along with one of the other suspects, for carrying a concealed weapon. Id. at 6-7. The Court determined that the officer possessed a reasonable belief that Terry was armed and dangerous. Id. at 30. ever, creates significant practical problems that the Court in Long did not address. While the Court recognized that a protective search can only comport with the fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches when the scope of the search is justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible, 5 the Court failed to sufficiently explicate the circumstances and limitations of a protective automobile search. By failing to adequately establish these guidelines, the Court may have permitted police officers to conduct searches that cannot be justified under the fourth amendment.
II. MCHIGAN v LoNG

A. THE FACTS
In the early hours of August 25, 1977, two Barry County 6 Sheriff deputies observed David Long driving erratically and at an excessive speed. 7 Long's car swerved into a ditch, and the deputies stopped to investigate. Long, leaving the driver's door open, met the deputies near the back of the car. Long was slow in responding to the deputies' request for his driver's license. The deputies suspected that Long was " 'under the influence of something.' " The deputies asked Long to produce his vehicle registration, but instead of answering, Long began to return to the open door of his vehicle. The deputies followed him but, upon spotting a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of Long's vehicle, prevented Long from reentering his automobile. The deputies subjected Long to a Tery pat-down frisk, 9 but found no other weapons.
10
One of the deputies then shone his flashlight into Long's car to search for additional weapons. The deputy spotted a small leather pouch protruding from under the driver's armrest." The deputy examined the pouch and discovered that it contained marijuana. Long was arrested for possession of marijuana. The deputies then searched the trunk of Long's car and found 75 pounds of marijuana. (1976) . In Opperman, the police conducted a standard inventory of the entire contents of a car impounded for multiple parking violations. They discovered marijuana in the glove box and subsequently arrested Opperman, the car's owner. The Supreme Court held that this standard caretaking procedure was reasonable because of an owner's significantly diminished privacy expectations in a car, a need to protect owners from loss of property, protect police from claims over lost property, and protect police from physical danger. Justice O'Connor found that these prior alternatives for deciding to take jurisdiction were unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, outright dismissal of such cases is unsatisfactory because uniformity in federal law cannot be achieved when the Supreme Court fails to review an opinion that rests primarily upon federal grounds but where that basis is not clear from the four corners of the opinion. Second, vacation and continuance are unacceptable because of the delay, the decrease in administrative efficiency, and the significant burden placed upon the state court when called upon to demonstrate the presence or absence of the Court's jurisdiction. Third, it is unsatisfactory for the Supreme Court to examine state law because the Court is generally unfamiliar with the state laws, and the parties often have not fully argued those laws. 103 S. Ct. at 3475.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, expressed his belief that the Court's new approach will increase the danger of advisory opinions without enhancing administrative efficiency. Id. at 3483 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens, dissenting, stated that the Court's new approach to resolving the issue of jurisdiction defies the doctrine of stare decisis. According to Justice Stevens, cases in which a state court has "overprotected" the citizen are not of inherent interest to the Supreme Court. The Court should not stretch its jurisdiction to reverse a state court's decision to set a criminal free. Id. at 3491-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens claimed that an historic presumption exists against taking jurisdiction when it is unclear whether state grounds are dependent upon federal law. Id. at 3489 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Steven's greatest concerns, however, were the conservation of the scarce federal resources of the Supreme Court, and the Court's burgeoning docket. Id. at 3491 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 20 (1958) . These exceptions can be grouped into three categories: "consent searches, a very limited class of routine searches, and certain searches conducted under circumstances of haste that render the obtaining of a search warrant impracticable." Amsterdam, supra, at 358. Under the third category, a warrantless search can be made of a motor vehicle when an officer has probable cause to believe that the object of the search is in the car. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (search of automobile was valid when agents had probable cause to believe that the automobile contained contraband). Likewise, a warrantless search of an arrestee, and the area within the arrestee's immediate control, is permitted after a valid custodial arrest based on probable cause. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) . In Robinson, a police officer searched a crumpled cigarette package found in the arrestee's pocket. The Court held that incident to a lawful custodial arrest, an officer is allowed to fully search the arrestee. Id. at 236; see also infra note 33. 26 The primary interest furthered by a protective search is the safety of the police officer. The Court in Tery concluded that it is clearly unreasonable to deny an officer the power to neutralize the threat of physical harm by checking a suspect for weapons when the officer reasonably believes the suspect may be armed and dangerous. 392 U.S. at 24.
27 The Supreme Court has found that a protective weapon search of the exterior of a suspect's clothing is a "severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security" and "an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Id. at 24-25. The majority then elaborated on the justification for a protective search of a car's interior. Justice O'Connor emphasized the danger posed by investigatory stops of suspects in motor vehicles. She pointed out that a suspect's access to weapons, and not merely the presence of a weapon hidden in the suspect's clothing, may endanger a police officer.
3 2 Relying on Chimel v. California 33 and New York v. Belton, 34 the Court recognized that the passenger compartment of a car is under the control of a suspect, and is an area from which a suspect can acquire a weapon. 35 Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Michigan Supreme Court's finding that a suspect under the control of an officer does not have immediate access to his vehicle, and thus, does not have control of weapons hidden in the car. 36 Justice O'Connor stated that a suspect can still gain access to his vehicle by breaking away from the officer, or by being permitted to reenter his vehicle to retrieve something from it.
37
Consequently, the Court, after balancing the interests, concluded that when a police officer possesses a reasonable belief that a suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, the officer may conduct a limited protective search of the passenger compartment of the suspect's vehicle. In order for an officer to reasonably believe that a suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer's belief must be based on "specific and articulate facts which, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts," reasonably lead the officer to conclude the search is warranted.
3 9 The majority in Long concluded that the sheriff deputies possessed a reasonable belief that Long was dangerous because Long had just driven his car into a ditch, he had appeared intoxicated, he was 32 Id. at 3480. 33 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chzinel, the Supreme Court recognized that a suspect has access not only to weapons hidden on his person, but also to weapons hidden in an area within the suspect's immediate control. Thus, the Court held that incident to an arrest, it is reasonable to search "the area 'within . . .[the arrestee's] immediate control' " so that the arrestee cannot gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Id. at 763.
34 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In Be/ton, the Court stated that in a situation involving an individual with his car, the area within that person's immediate control includes the "relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of. . .[the] automobile. Id. at 460. In Belton, the occupants of an automobile were arrested for possession of marijuana. After the arrest, the officer searched the car and found cocaine in a zipped pocket of Belton's coat which was located on the back seat. Id. at 456. That search was held to be valid under the principles of Chime/. The Court in Be/ton defined the area within the suspect's immediate control as encompassing the passenger compartment of a car, and any containers found within. 
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[Vol. 74 slow in answering questions, the incident had taken place in a rural area early in the morning, and Long was about to reenter a car in which the officers had spotted a large hunting knife.4 The officers had appropriately limited their search to those areas of the car over which Long had immediate control and that could have contained a weapon. 4 1 Therefore, "[t]he officers did not act unreasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure that there were no other weapons in the car." '42 Justice Brennan, dissenting, 43 stated that a Ter , stop authorizes no more than a limited search of the outer clothing of a person for weapons, not a search of a person's car based on mere reasonable suspicion.44 According to Justice Brennan, the majority in Long improperly relied upon Chime and Belton because both cases involved a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest based on probable cause instead of a Te ry-type protective search. 45 Furthermore, Justice Brennan claimed that the majority in Long failed to distinguish between the scope and purpose of a Terry search. The scope of the search is determined not only by the purpose, but also by the intrusiveness of the search. 46 Justice Brennan argued that because the search of a suspect's unoccupied car is more intrusive than a patdown search of the suspect, the Court improperly applied Teny to an 40 103 S. Ct. at 3481. 41 Id. The Court in Trry stated that the scope of a protective search is limited to "an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." 392 U.S. at 29. In Long, the deputy shone his flashlight only into the car's passenger compartment. The officers found a leather pouch which could have contained a weapon, and thus, the officer justifiably examined the contents of the pouch. 103 S. Ct , J., dissenting) .
In Place, the police detained an airline passenger's luggage based on a reasonable belief that his luggage contained narcotics. While the seizure of Place's luggage was unreasonable because it extended over a period of two days, the Court determined that the principles of Terry permitted an officer to briefly detain luggage and investigate the circumstances that aroused the officer's suspicion. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2644-45.
45 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3484 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The sole purpose of a protective search is to discover hidden weapons that may be used against the officer or others nearby. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. A search incident to arrest, while justified in part by the necessity to protect the officer, is also justified by the need to preserve evidentiary matter. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) . 46 103 S. Ct. at 3486 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
area search which exceeds the requisite limited scope.
47
Justice Brennan then concluded that the majority's reliance on a balancing test was inappropriate. 48 He noted that the Court in Dunaway v. New York had stated that a balancing test is used only when an intrusion falls far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest.
49
Probable cause must be present when the severity of the intrusion approaches that of an arrest.
5 0 According to Justice Brennan, an area search is "precisely 'the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest' ";51 balancing the relevant interests is unjustified because an area search cannot be sustained in the absence of probable cause. 
The Limitations of a Terry Search.: Exceeding the Pat-Down Frisk
The Supreme Court has never limited the scope of a Terry search to the body of a person. In Terry, the Court held that an officer who reasonably believes a suspect to be armed and dangerous may conduct a limited pat-down search of the outer clothing of the suspect for the sole purpose of discovering concealed weapons.
5 3 The Court examined the method of the search in light of the standard that justified the search .
4
Thus, in Terry, the policeman's method of searching was appropriate 47 Id. at 3486-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 48 Id. at 3487 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 49 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) . In Dunaway, the police had picked up the suspect, brought him to police headquarters for questioning, and placed him in an interrogation room where he would have been physically restrained if he had tried to leave. The police neither formally arrested the suspect, nor did they have probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 203. The Court determined that this seizure was unlawful because it was indistinguishable from a traditional arrest and thus required probable cause. Moreover, the Supreme Court expanded Terry in a subsequent case to permit a protective search not commenced with a pat-down frisk. In Adams v. Williams,58 an informant tipped off a police officer about a man alleged to be dealing narcotics and carrying a gun in his waistband. The suspect was seated in a car and the police officer asked him to get out. When the man refused to do so, the officer reached through the open window and immediately removed a concealed revolver from the man's waistband. The Court in Adams, relying on Terry, found that "[u]nder these circumstances the policeman's action in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and . . . was [therefore] reasonable." 60 The Court in Adams permitted a protective search without an initial pat-down frisk because the circumstances prevented the officer from neutralizing danger through less instrusive means.
6 ' Likewise, the prin- Id. at 148. The officer justifiably searched the suspect even though his information was not based on personal observation but on the observations of an informant. Because the suspect failed to step out of the car at the officer's request, "the revolver allegedly at. . . [the suspect's] waist became an even greater threat." Id. at 148. Professor LaFave has suggested that "the suspect's failure to respond to the officer's order to alight from the vehicle made it impossible for the officer to carry out an effective pat-down or to conduct even a partial patdown without putting himself into a much more dangerous position vis-a-vis the suspect." 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4, at 125 (1978).
6t Adam, 407 U.S. at 148. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a case decided prior to Adams, the Supreme Court had found that a search conducted by an officer who thrust his hand into the suspect's pocket without an initial exploration was invalid not only because the search was motivated by the officer's improper purpose in looking for drugs, but because its scope was too extensive. Id. at 64-65. The search in Siron, however, failed not because of its increased intrusivenessper se, but because it was unnecessarily intrusive in that a less intrusive manner of searching would have secured the officer's safety. The Court noted that the manner of "[t]he search was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception-the protection of the officer." Id. at 65. ciples of Teny do not preclude further inquiry into the reasonableness of a protective search of the passenger compartment of a suspect's automobile if the scope of the search is minimally necessary to insure the officer's safety. 62 
The Balancing Test: Reasonableness and the Automobile Search
In Long, the Court relied upon Teny and applied a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a protective search of an automobile passenger compartment without probable cause. 6 3 The majority properly applied the balancing test to this automobile search.
In a very thorough search of a suspect 7 ' and the passenger compartment of the suspect's car. 72 The purposes of a search incident to arrest include not only the discovery of weapons, but also the discovery and protection of evidence. 73 Therefore, when searching an individual, the officer is not restricted to a protective pat-down of the arrestee's clothes, 74 but may conduct a thorough search of the passenger compartment of the arrestee's vehicle and examine the contents of any containers found therein regardless of whether they may conceal a weapon.
75
A protective weapon search, on the other hand, is less intrusive than a search incident to an arrest because the search must be restricted to those areas in which a weapon could be hidden. 76 The principles of Ter, do not permit an officer to search a container found after a patdown when that container could not hold a weapon. 77 The Court in Long restricted the protective automobile search to the passenger compartment of a car, and further limited the search to those areas in which a weapon may have been placed or hidden. 78 Thus, because a Terry search of an automobile is less intrusive than a search incident to arrest, the Court properly applied the Terry balancing test to a protective automobile search.
The Interests Involved: The Primacy of Ofer Safey
When using a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a search, the Court weighs the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. The officer's safety and the safety of others nearby is the immediate justification for a protective search of an automobile. 75 The authority to search incident to custodial arrest will permit a search of "containers [that] will sometimes be such that they could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested." Belton, 453 U.S. at 461.
76 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3480. 77 Professor LaFave has noted that a "container [withdrawn from the suspect's pocket] should not be opened unless it might contain a weapon, a judgment which the officer should be expected to make on the basis of its size, weight and feel." 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 9.4, at 132. search of a suspect who may be armed and dangerous.
8 0 The resultant intrusion on the suspect's personal sanctity did not outweigh the interest of police officer safety; thus, a limited intrusion designed to protect a police officer can be a reasonable search under the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court in Chimel recognized that protecting a police officer could involve more than just removing weapons from the clothing of a suspect. The officer could be physically harmed as a result of a suspect's access to weapons in an area within the suspect's immediate control."' In addition, the Court in Belton recognized that the passenger compartment of an automobile and any containers therein are in an area into which the suspect could reach for a weapon. 82 The Court in Long appropriately used these two cases of search incident to arrest to analyze a Terry stop of an automobile. The majority in Long relied upon Chimel merely to indicate that the Court has previously recognized that weapons hidden within a suspect's reach pose a danger to police officers. Likewise, the majority in Long used Belton only to point out that the passenger compartment of an automobile and any containers therein are within the reach of the suspect. Thus, although Long did not involve a search incident to arrest, the Court used Chimel and Belton only to identify a potential source of police danger, and to note that in the absence of a protective search of an automobile, the interest of officer safety is not secured.
3 While the Court in Long noted the gravity of an intrusion into a suspect's automobile, 8 4 the Court, consistent with the principles of Terry, determined that a proper balance of the interests favored officer safety. 5 This conclusion is a logical extension of Tery and its progeny.
B. THE DIFFICULTIES OF APPLYING A PROTECTIVE SEARCH TO THE AUTOMOBILE
L Determining the Amount of Evidence for Reasonable Suspicion
Under Terry, an officer may conduct a protective search only when he reasonably concludes that a suspect is armed and dangerous.
8 6 Not all stops call for a Tery search. 87 When an officer reasonably believes (1968) . 87 The question of "whether it is proper to make a protective search incident to a stopping for investigation is a question separate from the issue of whether it is permissible to stop the suspect." 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 9.4, at 115. that the suspect has committed a violent crime, however, the right to search is concomitant with the right to stop the suspect. 8 In other types of crimes "such as trafficking in small quantities of narcotics, possession of marijuana, illegal possession of liquor, prostitution, bookmaking, or vagrancy," other circumstances must be present to justify a Terry search. 89 Typical circumstances include "a characteristic bulge in the suspect's clothing; observation of an object . . . which might be a weapon; an otherwise inexplicable sudden movement toward a . . . place where a weapon could be concealed;. . . and awareness that the suspect had previously been armed." ' 9 Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Long that "the Court's requirement that an officer have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous does little to check the initiation of an area search." 9 ' In Long, a large hunting knife, an apparently intoxicated driver, a dark night, and a rural area combined to prompt a weapon search of Long's car. 92 Aside from possessing a large hunting knife, David Long was not readily distinguishable from numerous other intoxicated late night drivers. The Court did not explicitly state whether, in the absence of Long's hunting knife, the officer could have conducted the protective search. If the officer could have searched anyway, the Court in Long would have authorized car searches based on little more than inebriation and the hour of the night.
The Court, however, emphasized that the officers did not frisk Long until after they had observed the hunting knife.
9 3 Thus, one could reasonably conclude that Long's apparent intoxication and the late hour of the night were not decisive factors, and that without the observation of the knife, the officers could not have properly searched the car. A Terry stop of a taciturn, confused, and somewhat inebriated individual is more closely grouped with nonviolent crimes like bookmaking, vagrancy, and trafficking in small quantities of narcotics for which the right to search is founded upon additional circumstances, than with dangerous crimes from which the right to search automatically flows from the right to stop. Therefore, the Court in Long most likely concluded that a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the suspect's car established the requisite "other circumstances" permitting a Terry search.
Terry requires not only that a police officer have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed, but also that the suspect is dangerous. 94 In most Terry stops, if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed, "then it will follow that there is the requisite suspicion that he is dangerous because [the suspect] is confronting an officer who is investigating the possibility that he is engaged in criminal conduct. '95 In a Terry encounter with a suspect and an automobile, it is unclear when an officer may reasonbly conclude that a suspect is armed and dangerous.
A police officer may presume that typical weapons such as guns or knives within the passenger compartment of the suspect's car are always dangerous. Automobiles, however, will often contain items that could conceivably make effective weapons but which are not in any way intended for that purpose (e.g., a baseball bat, a hammer, a tire iron, or a steel tow chain). An officer who reasonably believes that a suspect has a concealed tire iron strapped to his body would, following Terry, be permitted to frisk that individual because the officer may reasonably assume that the suspect intends to use the tire iron as a weapon. 96 But an officer cannot so readily conclude that the presence of a tire iron on the floor of a car can similarly be the impetus for a protective search of the entire passenger compartment. Because the presence of a tire iron in a car may be ordinary and generally benign, it is not necessarily an accurate indicia of the dangerousness of the suspect. An officer's safety is not jeopardized by a suspect who is not dangerous. A protective search that is not justified by the need to protect the officer or others nearby is unreasonable. 98 Thus, protective searches of the passenger compartment of a car based solely upon the presence of a tire iron or a baseball bat may result in frequent violations of the fourth amendment because of the low correlation between the presence of these objects and the dangerousness of the suspect.
Detennining the Suspect's Area of Immediate Control
Terry principles permit an extension of a protective search from the body of a suspect to the passenger compartment of a car and the con- 97 A tire iron in a car could pose a danger to a police officer. A tire iron within the reach of an ostensibly irrational suspect could reasonably lead an officer to conclude that the suspect is dangerous because of his access to this potential weapon.
98 Teny, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 29.
tainers therein only when an officer reasonably believes that a suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. 99 Because a suspect can only gain immediate control of weapons from his automobile when he is in control of his automobile, it is necessary to determine when the passenger compartment of a vehicle is within the suspect's immediate control. Incident to a custodial arrest, an officer may search the passenger compartment of the arrestee's car. The justification for this search, in part, is that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon.' "10 The Court in Long recognized that a suspect who is not arrested may similarly gain access to weapons.' 0 ' A number of circumstances exist, however, in which the subject of a Terry stop would not have immediate access to his vehicle.1 0 2 For example, a suspect who has walked back to a patrol car some distance from his own automobile may not have immediate access to his automobile. Officer safety can be secured, however, without establishing a general rule that an officer can always search a suspect's automobile because of the possibility of the suspect's future access to the interior of his car.
A suspect who is in the control of police officers may gain immediate control of his automobile by either breaking away from the officers, or by being permitted to reenter the vehicle. A suspect capable of breaking away from an investigating officer and reaching his car is in immediate control of his vehicle. Consequently, Tery principles do not proscribe a protective search of the passenger compartment of the cars of suspects capable of breaking away from the investigating officers. Courts need not presume, however, that every suspect is capable of breaking away from the investigating officer because certain circumstances may effectively preclude a suspect from entering the passenger compartment of his car. For example, in many situations the police officers may be between the suspect and his locked car door. Therefore, the Court should require the police officer to determine whether a suspect may gain control of his automobile from the particular factual circumstances of the individual encounter. 105 The validity of the protective search, then, would turn on whether the police officer reasonably believed that even though the suspect was under the control of the officers, he was still capable of breaking away and acquiring access to a weapon.
Police officers also may expressly permit a suspect to gain access to his automobile either during or after the Terry investigation. 1 0 6 If the need arises for the suspect to retrieve something from his car during the investigation, then at that time, if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is dangerous and will gain access to weapons upon entering the vehicle, the officer can conduct a Terry search of the suspect's automobile.
Likewise, at the conclusion of the Terry investigation, if the suspect has not been arrested, the suspect will be allowed to reenter the automobile. 10 7 At that time, the suspect will have access to any weapons hidden in the vehicle. If, at the conclusion of the investigation, the officer reasonably believes that the suspect may harm the officer, then the principles of Terry allow the officer to search the suspect's vehicle for weapons.
Because a suspect by this time has successfully concluded the encounter with the police officer and is now safely ensconced in the automobile, however, it is unlikely that the suspect will wish to reestablish contact with the law by trying to harm the officer.' 0 8 Thus, although situations may arise in which an officer reasonably believes that a suspect may harm the officer even though the officer has finished the Terry investiga-105 Teny principles already require an officer to use a reasonably prudent man standard to determine whether the suspect is armed and dangerous. Teny, 392 U.S. at 24, 27-28.
106 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3481-82. A suspect may be required to obtain information from within the automobile during the Teny investigation (e.g., driver's license, automobile registration, or insurance card).
107 Id. at 3481. 108 Professor LaFave has stated that "[if] a person is stopped for running a stop sign, it hardly seems plausible to suggest that after he is ticketed and returns to his car he will then seize a gun and try to overtake the police car and shoot the officers." 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 60, § 9.4, at 137 (footnote omitted).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court in Michigan v. Long extended Trry to permit a protective area search of the passenger compartment of a car. This decision is doctrinally consistent with the principles developed in Terry. The Court correctly identified the passenger compartment of a suspect's automobile as a place in which a suspect can conceal weapons and appropriately permitted a police officer to search that area when the officer reasonably believed that the suspect was dangerous and had immediate access to weapons.
The Court, however, did not explicate the circumstances and limitations of the protective automobile search. An officer should not commence a protective search unless he reasonably believes that the suspect intends to gain control of weapons hidden in the passenger compartment of the automobile within the immediate control of the suspect. If the police officer has control over the suspect, then the passenger compartment of the suspect's automobile is within the immediate control of the suspect only when the officer reasonably determines that the suspect is capable of breaking away from the investigating officers or when the officer allows the suspect to reenter the car. Following these guidelines, a protective automobile search should successfully comply with the principles of Tery.
TIMOTHY M. ISON
109 Although the Court in Long pointed out that T7r, does not require officers to adopt alternate measures of ensuring their safety to avoid the intrusion involved in a Teny-type search, 103 S. Ct. at 3482 n.16, an officer's decision to search the passenger compartment of an automobile based on the possibility that a suspect may break away from-the officer or will be permitted to reenter the vehicle is not a choice among less intrusive means of neutralizing a threat to officer safety. Rather, it is a determination as to whether an officer is actually in danger as a result of a suspect's access to weapons. Thus, this decision is similar to decisions officers already make under Teny. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
